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Constitutional Law-EQUAL PROTECTION-PARENT A D 
CHILD-ADOPTION-UNWED FATHER HAS EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHT 
TO CONSENT-caban u. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
Abdiel Caban and Maria Gonzalez lived together out of wed- 
lock for nearly four and a half years. During this period Maria 
bore two children. Caban's name appeared on the children's birth 
certificates, and Caban contributed to their support.l 
Three years after the birth of the first child, Maria left Caban 
for a relationship with another man, Kazim Mohammed, taking 
the children with her. Within a month she and Mohammed were 
married. Though Caban did not contribute to the children's sup- 
port while they lived with their mother and her new husband, he 
visited them regularly.' 
When the Mohammeds filed a petition for adoption of the 
~ h i l d r e n , ~  Caban cross-petitioned. After a hearing in the surro- 
gate's court, the Mohammeds' petition was granted.4 As a result, 
any parental rights or obligations Caban might have had were 
terminated. The surrogate relied on Section 111 of the New York 
Domestic Relations Law,J which limits consent rights in the adop- 
tion of illegitimate children to the natural mother. Caban's op- 
portunities in the hearing were therefore limited to attempting to 
subvert Maria's consent privilege by impugning her parental fit- 
nessQr attempting to show that  the Mohammeds' adoption 
1. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979). 
2. Id. a t  382. 
3. Id. a t  383 & n.1. According to New York statute, the parent and his or her spouse 
may adopt the offspring of either, born in or out of wedlock. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 
(McKinney 1977). A New York court has held that this statute provides for adoption of 
illegitimate children by their mother. In re Anonymous Adoption, 177 Misc. 683, 31 
N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sur. Ct. 1941). 
4. 441 U.S. a t  383-84. 
5. "Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be re- 
quired as follows: . . . Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of 
wedlock . . . ." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1) (McKinney 1977). 
6. Maria's consent would not have been required for any disposition of the children 
if Caban could have proven the existence of any of the following criteria by which parental 
consent may be dispensed with: (1) failure to visit or communicate with the children for 
more than six months, (2) surrender of the children to an adoption or welfare agency, (3) 
appointment of a guardian for the children because of parental unfitness, (4) loss of civil 
rights, or (5) mental illness or retardation making Maria a t  present and in the future 
incapable of caring properly for the children. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(2) (McKinney 
1977). 
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would not serve the best interests of the children.' Even had he 
succeeded, any possibility of his own adoption of the children, as 
noted by the surrogate,%ould be foreclosed as long as Maria 
withheld her consent. 
Failing in the state  court^,^ Caban appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. He argued that section 111 violated the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in allowing 
all parents but unwed fathers the right to consent to the adoption 
of their children.'We also claimed that his due process right to 
maintain his relationship with his children had been revoked 
without a finding that he was an unfit parent! Considering only 
the equal protection argument as it related to the distinction 
drawn between unwed mothers and unwed fathers,I2 the Court 
found that the classification was not substantially related to the 
state's objective of promoting adoption. Accordingly, it found 
section 11 1 unconstitutional as applied.13 
Stanley v. IllinoisI4 marks the beginning of the contemporary 
development of unwed fathers' rights. Before Stanley, the unwed 
father was generally without rights, and all parental rights re- 
sided in the unwed mother.'" few jurisdictions, however, recog- 
7. 441 U.S. a t  386-87. Doe v. Roe, 37 A.D.2d 433,326 N.Y .S.2d 421 (1971), articulates 
the New York best-interests-of-the-child standard. See also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW $ 111- 
a(3) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). But see Corey L. v. Martin L., 45 N.Y.2d 383,391,380 
N.E.2d 266, 270, 408 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (1978) (parental interest standard supercedes the 
best-interests-of-the-child standard). 
8. 441 U.S. a t  384; Appendix to Appellant's Brief a t  27, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 
U.S. a t  380 (1979). 
9. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in In re David A.C., 56 A.D.2d 
627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1977), affirmed the surrogate's opinion on grounds that the consti- 
tutional challenge to 4 111 was foreclosed by the New York Court of Appeals decision in 
In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), appeal 
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U S .  
1042 (1977). 
The court of appeals did likewise in a memorandum decision. In re David A.C., 43 
N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977). 
10. 441 U.S. a t  385. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. a t  394 n.16. 
13. Id. a t  394. 
14. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
15. See, e . g ,  Adoption of a Minor, 338 Mass. 635, 156 N.E.2d 801 (1959) (during 
illegitimacy, natural mother acts in her own behalf and as the father's agent in all matters 
affecting the child); Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 12 Utah 2d 235,364 P.2d 1029 (1961) 
(father of illegitimate not recognized as having any paternal status under common law). 
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nized custodial rights in the unwed father if paternal custody 
served the child's best interest;I6 a few recognized a right to con- 
sent to adoption if the child were legitimated.I7 Stanley indicated 
that an unwed father could have a constitutionally protectable 
right in his relationship with his illegitimate child, one that could 
not be terminated without a hearing on his parental fitness. A 
subsequent case, Quilloin v. Walcott, Is clarified that the relation- 
ship to be protected was not merely biological, but arose from 
significant support and custody of the child. 
16. See, e.g., In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N. W.2d 27 (1967); In re Brennan, 
270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965). In these cases the mother had surrendered her 
rights to the child. The father was found to have rights to custody as against all but the 
mother. The father in In re Mark T. had lived with the mother and child, had paid all 
birth expenses, and had supported the family until the mother left him, taking the child 
with her. He had even proffered marriage, but was refused. The mother released the child 
for adoption without telling the father, and the adoption agency, even though it knew that 
the parents had been living together with the child, did not notify him. The father filed a 
writ of habeas corpus after a persistent search, as the child had been placed with adoptive 
parents and their petition for adoption had been filed. In giving custody of the child to 
the father the court wrote: 
A common theme which runs through the cases, those concerning both 
legitimate and illegitimate children, is that an established family relationship 
is ordinarily to be preferred and protected. 
. . . .  
We are not aware of any sociological data justifying the assumption that 
an illegitimate child reared by his natural father is less likely to receive a proper 
upbringing than one reared by his natural father who was a t  one time married 
to his mother, or that the stigma of illegitimacy is so pervasive it requires 
adoption by strangers and permanent termination of a subsisting relationship 
with the child's father. 
8 Mich. App. a t  141, 146, 154 N.W.2d at  36, 39. Cf. Roe v. Doe, 58 Mich. 2d 757, 296 
N.Y.S.2d 865 (Fam. Ct. 1968) (father has parental rights secondary to  those of mother 
with respect to child born out of wedlock); Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 
(1965) (mother, if a suitable person, has paramount right to custody of the child). 
17. In all jurisdictions an unwed father acquires consent rights by marriage to the 
mother and acknowledgement of paternity. The only issue has been timing-whether a 
post-birth marriage and legitimation invalidates a mother's consent to adoption and the 
child's placement with adoptive parents. See, e.g., Ellis v. Woods, 214 Ga. 105,103 S.E.2d 
297 (1958) (father's consent required if marriage occurs before mother's consent to adop- 
tion); Warner v. Ward, 401 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1966) (father's consent required if marriage 
occurs before final judgment of adoption). 
The few jurisdictions that gave the father a consent right without marriage to the 
mother, did so on the condition that the unwed father legitimated the child by voluntary 
acknowledgement or formal establishment of paternity. See, e . g ,  ALA. CODE tit. 27, fj 3 
(1958) (renumbered as § 26-10-3 in 1975) (establishment of paternity); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 
56-106 (1971) (repealed 1977) (current version a t  ARK. STAT. ANN. 4 56-206 (Supp. 1979)) 
(establishment of paternity); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.040 (1967) (establishment of paternal 
rights in proper court). 
18. 434 U S .  426 (1978). 
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A. Stanley v. Illinois 
Stanley had sired three children during an eighteen-year il- 
licit relationship with Joan Stanley. By not including unwed fa- 
thers in the definition of "parent,"1B the Illinois illegitimacy stat- 
ute conclusively presumed unwed fathers to be unfit. So after 
Joan Stanley's death, a dependency hearing was held, and the 
children were declared wards of the state. Stanley claimed that 
the statute violated his equal protection rights, since all parents 
but unwed fathers were provided a hearing on their fitness before 
being deprived of their children. The Illinois Supreme Court re- 
jected Stanley's claim, holding the presumption of the statute 
valid.20 
Stanley presented the same argument to the United States 
Supreme Court. The Court recognized the important interest 
some unwed fathers have in their off~pring,~' but rather than 
focusing on its protection under the equal protection clause, the 
Court recalled earlier cases that had overturned conclusive statu- 
tory presumptions like I l l ino i~ ' .~~  Reasoning that the administra- 
tive convenience of "procedure by presumption" was outweighed 
by Stanley's substantive right to his children, the Court held that 
the due process clause required a fitness hearing before this right 
could be terminated.23 The Court also added that since all other 
parents received such a hearing, depriving Stanley of a hearing 
contravened the equal protection clause. 
This tandem due process/equal protection holding created 
some confusion in the interpretation of the case: whether Stanley 
applied narrowly to similar fact situations, affording due process 
rights only to Stanley-like unwed fathers, or whether the equal 
- - 
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 4 701-14 (1967). 
20. In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), rev'd sub nom. Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U S .  645 (1972). 
21. "It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and 
management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect 
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic 
arrangements.' " 405 U.S. a t  651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,95 (1949) (Frank- 
furter, J., concurring)). 
22. 405 U.S. at 653-56. The Court referred to Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), 
which disapproved a post-automobile accident scheme that required, without reference 
to fault, a bond and license revocation, and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), which 
disapproved a Texas statute that presumed all military personnel to be nonresidents. 
23. Irrebutable presumption analysis has been severely criticized by members of the 
Court and others as "an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking itself." Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Vlandis 
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 462 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Ackerman, The Conclusive 
Presumption Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (1977). 
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protection language implied the broader requirement of extend- 
ing to all unwed fathers the same substantive rights given other 
parents.24 
B. Development of Unwed Fathers' Rights Since Stanley 
A footnote to Stanley that suggested notice be given to all 
unwed fathers, whether interested or not, supported a broad read- 
ing of the Court's opinion.25 A broad reading was also supported 
by the Court's subsequent remand of two cases "for further con- 
sideration in light of Stanley v .  Illinois. "26 In one case, 
Vanderlaan v.  Vanderlaan, 27 the Illinois courts had given custody 
of two illegitimate children to the mother over the father's objec- 
tions, because " 'a putative father should have no right to the 
society' of his children born out of wedlock."28 In the other, State 
ex rel. Lewis v .  Lutheran Social S e r v i ~ e , ~ ~  the Wisconsin courts 
had rejected an unwed father's challenge to a completed adoption 
of which he had not received notice? 
Influenced to take this broad view of Stanley, state courts 
invalidated legislation that denied the unwed father the consent 
privilege in the adoption of his ~ f f s p r i n g . ~ ~  As a result, state legis- 
latures were compelled to reformulate their adoption statutes to 
recognize the interests of the unwed father. The most extreme 
24. See Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights: 
Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527, 527-32 (1975); Comment, Protecting 
the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J .  
FAM. L. 115, 125-26 (1973). 
25. 405 U S .  a t  657 n.9. 
26. Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972); Rothstein v. Lutheran Social 
Serv., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). 
27. 126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970), vacated, 405 U S .  1051 (1972). 
28. Id. at  415,262 N.E.2d a t  720 (quoting DePhillips v. DePhillips, 35 Ill. 2d 154, 157, 
219 N.E.2d 465, 467 (1966)). 
29. 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran 
Social Serv., 405 U S .  1051 (1972). 
30. The Wisconsin Court quoted the following language of the Utah Supreme Court: 
"The claim of the plaintiffs is based upon the theory of a chattel ownership 
of the child, but no such right is capable of legal recognition. The putative father 
of an illegitimate child occupies no recognized paternal status a t  common law 
or under our statutes. The law does not recognize him a t  all, except that it will 
make him pay for the child's maintenance if it can find out who he is. The only 
father it recognizes as having any rights is the father of a legitimate child." 
47 Wis. 2d a t  434, 178 N.W.2d at  63 (quoting Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 12 Utah 
235, 239, 364 P.2d 1029, 1031-32 (1961)). 
31. E.g., People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 
291 (1972). Cf. Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976) (statute violative of 
state equal rights amendment). 
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legislative response unreservedly gave the unwed father rights 
equal to those of traditional parents-married parents and unwed 
mothers." Most states took-or retained-a more moderate ap- 
proach, placing some burden on the unwed father: from simple 
identification with the child by some sort of a~knowledgement,~" 
to proof of past and potential familial relat i~nship?~ New York, 
on the other hand, held to the narrow view of Stanley, requiring 
that notice of the adoption proceedings be given to certain unwed 
fathers," but never extending their paternal privilege as far as the 
consent right? 
Finally, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the 
scope of the unwed father's rights in Quilloin u. W a l ~ o t t . ~ ~  This 
32. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-106 (West Supp. 1979-1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, $ 908 
(Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1510 (1977) (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, 9.1-8 (Smith- 
Hurd Supp. 1979)); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.3 (West Supp. 1979-1980); WYO. STAT. $ 1-22- 
109 (1977). 
33. The minimum identification with the child required by the states was "presumed 
parenthood," a rebuttable presumption that arises from cohabitation, marriage correspon- 
ding with the child's birth, attempted marriage before birth, attempted marriage after 
birth with the father's name on the birth certificate or a voluntary promise of support, or 
reception of the child into the father's home and openly holding him to be the father's 
natural child. CAL. CIV. CODE $ 9  224, 7004 (West Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. 4 19-6- 
105 (1978); IND. CODE ANN. 4 31-3-1-6 (Burns Supp. 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105 
(1978). Most states require that the child be legitimated or paternity be established before 
an unwed father may be extended a consent privilege. ALA. CODE $26-10-3 (1975); ALASKA 
STAT. § 20.15.040 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. $ 56-206 (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
$ 4  45-61d, 61i (West Supp. 1979); D.C. CODE 5 16-304 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 
(West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. 9 4  74-403, -406 (Supp. 1979); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-2 
(1976) ; IDAHO CODE 16-1504 (1979); IND. CODE. ANN. 5 31-3-1-6 (Burns Supp. 1979); KY. 
REV. STAT. 4 199.500 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 9:404 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 16, 74 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, $6 2, 4A (West Supp. 1979); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS 4 710.33 (Supp. 1979-1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.26 (West Supp. 1979); 
MONT. CODE ANN. 40-6-126 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 43-104.02 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 41.530 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 170-B:5 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. $ 9:3-38 (West 
Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. $ 5  46-7-6 to 7 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-6 (Supp. 
1977); N.D. CENT. CODE $ 9  14-15-05 to 06 (1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.094 (1977); S.D. 
CODIFIPD LAWS ANN. 8 25-6-1.1 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 36-111 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. 
$ 78-30-4 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 8 26.32.040 (Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-1 
(Supp. 1979). 
34. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532-C (Supp. 1978-1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
710.39 (Supp. 1979-1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.26 (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
$ 9:3-46 (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-6 (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. 4 
109.098 (1977); S.C. CODE jj 15-45-70 (1976 & Supp. 1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS # 25-6-1 
(1976). 
35. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 4 I l l - a  (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1978-1979). 
36. Other states continued to deny the unwed father a consent right. KAN. STAT. 
ANN. 4 59-2102 (1976); Mrss. CODE ANN. 93-17-5 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 8 3107.06 
(Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § §  60.5, .6 (Supp. 1978-1979); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 1, § 411 (Purdon Supp. 1964-1978) (statute declared violation of state equal rights 
amendment, Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976)). 
37. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
CASENOTE 
case dealt specifically with the application of Stanley in the con- 
text of an adoption objected to by an unwed father who had never 
lived with his illegitimate child, contributed to the child's sup- 
port, or taken steps to achieve legitimation? Shortly after the 
child's birth the mother married Walcott. Nine years later step- 
father Walcott petitioned for adoption. Upon notice of the adop- 
tion, Quilloin petitioned for legitimation and objected to the 
adoption." Applying the "best interests of the child" standard, 
the trial court denied Quilloin's legitimation petition, terminated 
his parental rights, and granted the adoption. The Georgia Su- 
preme Court affirmed.40 
Relying on S t ~ n l e y , ~ '  Quilloin argued to the United States 
Supreme Court that his interests had not been adequately pro- 
tected by the best-interests-of-the-child standard, and that  he 
was entitled "to an absolute veto over the adoption of his child 
absent a finding of his unfitness as a parent."" The Court re- 
sponded that since Quilloin had never had nor sought custody, 
and since the adoption would perpetuate a family unit already in 
existence, his substantive due process interests were adequately 
protected by the best-interests standard.43 The Court also found 
Quilloin's interests, for equal protection purposes, distinguisha- 
ble from those of legal fathers who had divorced or separated from 
the mother and who no longer lived with the child. Though Quil- 
loin had been subject to the same child-support obligation as a 
legal father would have been, he had never "exercised actual or 
legal custody over his child, and thus [had] never shouldered 
any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervi- 
sion, education, protection, or care of the child,"44 something a 
legal father would have done as a matter of course. 
The unanimous Quilloin holding indicated that the Court 
viewed Stanley narrowly, and that the unequivocal extension of 
equal rights to the unwed father by some legislatures was an 
4 6 over-rea~tion."~%n unwed father who neither had a custodial 
relationship with his child, nor sought one, was found not entitled 
to the adoption consent rights reserved to married parents and 
38. Id. at 247. 
39. Id. at 250. 
40. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977). 
41. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
42. 434 U S .  at 253. 
43. Id. at 255. 
44. Id. at 256. 
45. Barron, supra note 24, at 541. 
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unwed mothers. Conversely, an unwed father who has such a 
relationship with his child may be entitled to equal rights to 
consent. The extent to which this relational interest constitutes 
a basis for consent rights was further explored in Caban v. 
Mohammed. 
In Caban the Court took up the sex-discrimination argument 
left unconsidered by QuilZoin, 46 and so investigated the distinc- 
tions drawn between unwed mothers and unwed fathers in the 
adoption context. The Court rejected the argument that the dis- 
tinction of section 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law 
was justified by the fundamental difference between maternal 
and paternal relations. Admitting that this generalization might 
apply in the case of newborn infants, the Court said that the 
relationship of older children with their father may be fully com- 
parable to that with their mother.47 
Nor could the distinction be justified by problems of identifi- 
cation and location that would slow the adoption process. Even 
if such problems justified a legislative distinction between moth- 
ers and fathers of newborn children, they simply would not exist 
when the children are older and their father has not only admit- 
ted his paternity but has established a "substantial" relationship 
with them.4R Therefore, the Court found the statute's distinction 
not substantially related to the state's declared objective of pro- 
moting adoption of illegitimate children.49 
Cuban perpetuates the notion made clear in Quilloin that 
parental rights are not based merely on the biological relationship 
between parent and child. Instead, parental rights develop 
through contacts with the child in a familial situation. Caban also 
adds the refinement of distinguishing between fathers of new- 
borns and fathers of older children on the basis of their compara- 
tive likelihood of having this familial relationship with their chil- 
dren, and on the basis of the relative problems involved in their 
identification and Iocation. 
46. 434 U.S. a t  253 n.13. 
47. Caban v.  Mohammed, 441 U.S. a t  389. 
48. Id. a t  392-93. 
49. Id. a t  394. 
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A.  Caban Applies Principally to  the  Adoption of  Older Children 
Ca ban primarily impacts on the adoption of older chil- 
dren-children "past infancy9'-where the opportunity has ex- 
isted for the development of a parent-child relationship. But only 
those fathers who have admitted paternity," who "come forward 
to participate in the rearing of [their children],"" and who have 
"remain[ed]" with them," are entitled to consent to the adop- 
tion of their children. That the holding of the case is confined to 
fathers of that description is underscored by the dissent: "[The 
Court] confines its holding to cases such as the one a t  hand 
involving the adoption of an older child against the wishes of a 
natural father who previously has participated in the rearing of 
the child and who admits pat ern it^."^^ 
The distinction between fathers of older children and fathers 
of newborns is drawn in the "even if" statements of the opinion, 
which respond to the arguments that mothers are closer to their 
children than are fathers, and that particular difficulties in the 
location and identification of fathers are involved in the adoption 
of illegitimates. "Even if," the Court writes, a closer maternal 
relationship and problems of location and identification charac- 
terize the newborn adoption, they do not necessarily "persist past 
infancy."54 Therefore, a legislative distinction between mothers 
and fathers of newborns may be justified, but a distinction 
applicable in every case, which would fail to recognize a sub- 
stantial relationship between an  unwed father and his older child, 
would not. 
But this language alone ambiguously defines the protectable 
parent-child relationship. By the facts of the case, a father who 
has "come forward to participate in the rearing of his children" 
is one who has lived with the mother and the children in a de facto 
family for a significant period of time, acknowledged the children 
as his own, contributed to their support, and after estrangement 
from their mother, continued to visit them. According to Quilloin, 
the substance of the relationship is the father's "shoulder[ingl 
50. Id. a t  393. 
51. Id. at  392 (emphasis added). 
52. Id. a t  392 n.13. This footnote indicates that participation in the rearing of the 
children a t  some point in time is not enough; tbp father must also maintain, or attempt 
to maintain, an ongoing relationship with them a t  the time of the adoption proceedings. 
Of course the consent of any parent would be "dispensed with" upon proof of abandon- 
ment or neglect. See note 6 supra. 
53. Id. at  409 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
54. Id. a t  392. 
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. . . significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervi- 
sion, education, protection, or care of the child."" Cuban and 
Quilloin taken together suggest that actual physical custody is 
required. However, the father's relationship with his offspring is 
not jeopardized until estrangement from the mother. As the 
mother generally retains custody of the child after ~eparat ion,~" 
opportunities for contact with the child, even in the form of finan- 
cial support, may be limited. Consequently, attention to the so- 
cial relationship between parent and child alone may be insuffi- 
cient." For reasons beyond his control, the unwed father may 
have enjoyed little or no custodial relations with the child, but 
may have contributed, or attempted to contribute, significant 
support. 
The essence, then, of an unwed father's "com[ing] forward" 
is the demonstration of his commitment to the child's welfare 
over time-in other words, the demonstration that he has seized 
the opportunity, residing with the child or not, to do for the child 
what a legal father in similar circumstances presumedly does 
from marital obligation." This inquiry is not only important to 
the determination of the father's accrued rights to the child, but 
also to the evaluation of the likelihood of his future commitment 
to the child's welfare. 
The question of the father's future commitment is most 
immediate when the mother dies, her rights are terminated, or 
she surrenders the child for adoption by social and biological 
55. 434 U.S. a t  256. 
56. In some states an absolute preference for maternal custody exists, even for legiti- 
mate children. Most states apply a best-interests-of-the-child standard, but about half 
impose a maternal preference when the parental alternatives appear equal. However, 
where illegitimates are concerned, a traditional maternal preference strongly persists. See 
generally Foster & Freed, Life With Father: 1978, 11 FAM.  L.Q. 321 (1978). 
57. Some commentators say the sole point of inquiry should be the social relationship 
developed between the child and adults in the course of physical custody. These adults 
may or may not be the child's natural parents, but in the course of custody they become 
the child's "psychological parents," with whom the child develops primary psychological 
ties. The main objective of the law, they say, should be to achieve the child's best interests 
in the psychological, as well as the physical, sense. The interruption of the continuity of 
the child's ties to its psychological parent(s) may be detrimental to its normal develop- 
ment. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (1973). 
58. The significance of the marital tie is indicated by the dissent: 
The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relation- 
ship is clear. The validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by 
other measures. By tradition, the primary measure has been the legitimate 
familial relationship he creates with the child by marriage with the mother. 
441 U.S. 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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strangers. If in this circumstance the unwed father is allowed to 
veto adoption, he must gain custody of the child as a conse- 
quence? Such an unwed father cannot reasonably be found to 
have constitutionally protectable rights unless his commitment 
to the child's welfare is proven." Cuban indicates that a state 
may constitutionally require the demonstration of this commit- 
ment in the form of custodial responsibility or financial support. 
More troublesome is the situation in the instant case, where 
the mother and her new husband seek adoption of the child. Here 
the unwed father's custody will probably not be at  issue,61 and the 
vindication of paternal rights may only take the form of visitation 
privileged2 Yet vindication of these rights has the effect of fore- 
closing adoption," therefore perpetuating the child's illegitimate 
status and keeping the stepfather a foster parent.64 In Cuban the 
Court implicitly finds the interests of the child in legitimacy and 
the interests of the state in the solidification of the mother's new 
marriage outweighed by the unwed father's right to his child. 
Certainly only a substantial relationship should compete with 
these significant countervailing  interest^.^^ 
59. This is the Stanley situation, where the mother is not claiming any rights to  the 
child. The unwed father must be seeking custody in his objection to the adoption. Cer- 
tainly the Court does not contemplate placing the child in the limbo of foster care or 
institutionalization for an indefinite period in order that the unwed father be able to 
exercise visitation rights. Cf. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. a t  247 (unwed father did not 
seek custody, but only sought to block adoption). 
60. The majority's opinion fails to distinguish parental rights from the interests of 
the child. The result of extreme emphasis on parental rights is to treat children as a form 
of chattel. Emphasis on children's rights may result in nonrecognition of the value of 
maintaining blood ties. Actually the two standards are opposite sides of the same coin. 
Determination of one should be, to a similar extent, the determination of the other. See 
Petition of New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 641, 328 N.E.2d 854, 
860 (1975) (the two standards recognized as consisting of "different degrees of emphasis 
on the same factors," and as being "not separate and distinct but cognate and con- 
nected"). 
61. See note 56 supra. 
62. As a consequence of the Caban decision, the Mohammeds retained custody of the 
children subject to the stipulated visitation rights of Caban. Telephone conversation with 
Counsel for Appellee, Morris Shulslaper, New York City (Aug. 7, 1979). 
63. Axiomatic of adoption is the termination of all parental rights of the natural 
parent. As long as some right is given the natural father in this situation, adoption by the 
stepfather is impossible. This does not necessarily mean that illegitimacy should or will 
be permanent, since statutory provision is generally made that legitimacy results from the 
formal or informal establishment of paternity. See note 33 supra. 
64. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
65. The Court engaged in this kind of balancing in Quilloin. It must also be noted 
that illegitimacy may be more of a burden in some states than in others. At least two states 
have abolished the status; others have made the requirement for legitimation simply open 
acknowledgement of paternity. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS $ 5.2, a t  158 
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B. Application of Caban to the Adoption of Newborns 
Whether Caban applies to adoptions involving newborns is 
uncertain. The language of the Court is noncommital to the 
argued distinctions between newborn adoptions and adoptions of 
older ~hildren.~" footnote of the opinion indicates some judicial 
concern for unwed fathers of newborns by suggesting that legisla- 
tive adjustment give them rights contingent upon more stringent 
acknowledgement requirements or more strict definitions of 
abandonment? Conditioning the consent of the unwed father of 
a newborn on any definition of abandonment, though, contem- 
plates that some fathers of newborns might have a protectable 
interest in their offspring arising from support and care of the 
mother. However, assessing the father-child relationship accord- 
ing to the father-mother relationship has a certain fictional qual- 
ity and obstructs realistic assessment of the alternatives available 
to the child? 
At issue in a paternal challenge to a newborn adoption is not 
whether an existing relationship should be interrupted, one where 
parental commitment has already been demonstrated, but 
whether a parent-child relationship should be allowed to develop. 
I In the case of a newborn, this issue is decided without reference 
to a parental commitment time-tested in actual physical custody 
of the child, a circumstance greatly different from the pre-birth 
relationship between the father and mother alone. 
The best approach to the Court's opinion is to read the "even 
(1968). See statutes cited in note 33 supra. That illegitimacy remains a burden is demon- 
strated by a Supreme Court decision just four months before Caban that approved a 
statutory provision foreclosing an illegitimate's inheritance from his natural father be- 
cause he had not obtained a court order declaring paternity prior to his father's death. 
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). 
66. 441 U.S. a t  389, 392. 
67. Id. a t  392 n.11. 
68. California dealt with such a sympathetic circumstance years before Stanley in 
Lavell v. Adoption Inst., 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960). At the time, 
California had a statute that recognized a child as legitimate if the unwed father accepted 
the child into his home, acknowledged openly his paternity, and treated the child as 
legitimate. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 16-1510 
(1979). This informal legitimation gave the unwed father all parental rights enjoyed by 
traditional parents. Essentially, the statute recognized substantial familial relationships 
not formally sanctioned by marriage. In the context of a newborn adoption where the 
father had supported the mother, paid birth expenses, indicated a substantial degree of 
paternal commitment to a previous child, and shown a great interest in the newborn, the 
California court in Lavell held that an unborn child was an existing person for purposes 
of the legitimation statute. 185 Cal. App. 2d a t  561, 8 Cal. Rptr. a t  370. 
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if" language as approving maintenance of traditional statutory 
presumptions in newborn adoptions. Strong dissents support this 
position. The dissents argue that unwed mothers and fathers of 
newborns are not similarly situated. The mother decides to carry 
the child, gives birth, and provides immediate nurture." Conse- 
quently, the mother is always an identifiable parent. The father, 
on the other hand, is likely to be unknown, unavailable, or unin- 
terested. In these circumstances the child has an important inter- 
est in acquiring the "status of legitimacy," and obtaining "the 
basic necessities of life."'O Adoption can fulfill these needs, but 
adoptive parents are discouraged by delay and the possibility of 
confrontation with the natural parents. Requiring the unwed fa- 
ther's consent in all cases would fire adoptive parent fears, delay 
the adoption process, and perpetuate the child's i l legi t ima~y.~~ If 
the father is never located, notice would not only consume time 
and inject added uncertainty into the adoptive relationship, i t  
would create added administrative cost and needlessly invade the 
privacy of the mother.72 
These countervailing policy considerations-achievement of 
legitimacy and the encouragement of adoption-peculiarly in- 
volved with the adoption of newborns call for focus on the best 
interests of the child rather than on parental rights. Though the 
two standards essentially measure the same qualities of the 
parent-child relationship, they have different effects: the first 
enables a more expansive inquiry of the alternatives available to 
the child; the second potentially limits the inquiry to the alterna- 
tives offered by one or both of the natural parents.73 
As in the case of older child adoption, the father's relation- 
ship with his newborn offspring becomes pertinent only after the 
mother has consented to the child's adoption. If by virtue of his 
biological relationship and his seeking custody of the child the 
unwed father of the newborn acquired consent rights, simply 
proving his biological relationship would foreclose consideration 
of any adoption  alternative^.^^ A court's inquiry would likewise be 
69. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. a t  398-99 (Stewart J., dissenting); id. a t  404-05 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
70. Id. a t  402 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The state also has an interest-at least for 
the purpose of identification of the natural father's heirs-in the child's acquisition of 
legitimacy. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). 
71. 441 U.S. a t  407-08,410 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing In re Malpica-Orsini, 
36 N.Y.2d 568, 572-74, 33,l N.E.2d 486, 489-90, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 516-17 (1975)). 
72. 441 U.S. a t  408-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
73. See note 60 supra. 
74. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 97 Misc. 2d 927, 416 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Fam. Ct.  1979). 
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limited if the father of the newborn were allowed consent rights 
based on some kind of parent-child relationship. This parental 
right approach requires initial focus upon the relationship be- 
tween father and child. Only upon finding the lack of a protecta- 
ble relationship can the court's inquiry pass from parental rights 
to the best interests of the child in an adoption context. 
If an unwed father of a newborn seeks to block the adoption 
of his offspring, a court should not be confined to a paternal rights 
inquiry. Because such a father has not established a substantial 
relationship with the child, a court's procedure should focus on 
the child's best interests. Married parents, unwed mothers, and 
now some unwed fathers of older children are given consent rights 
in order to protect a real or presumed relationship with the child. 
Their consent right is based upon the presumption that a parent 
has first claim to the child without consideration of other alterna- 
tives, not just because of biological ties, but because of a commit- 
ment to the child's welfare, evidenced by a marital obligation, the 
biological nurture of pregnancy and infancy, or a time-based fam- 
ilial relati~nship.'~ Because he has neither married the mother nor 
had the opportunity to engage in a de facto familial relationship 
with the child, an unwed father of a newborn can present no 
substantial evidence of a real or presumptive commitment to the 
child's welfare. At best, a consent right could only be based upon 
speculative criteria related to the father's pre-birth relationship 
with the mother, or upon his post-birth indications of desire and 
In this case, decided since Caban, a college-aged couple produced a child after dating and 
the development of a "serious relationship." A month after the child's birth, the mother 
placed the child for adoption. The father, acknowledging paternity, appeared a t  the adop- 
tion proceedings to oppose the adoption and to gain custody of the child. Upon this action 
by the father, the mother withdrew her surrender for adoption and cross-petitioned for 
custody. The family court held that the unwed father had the right to veto the adoption 
and to gain custody. Considering the respective situations of the natural parents, as well 
as the mother's initial attempt to have the child adopted, the court judged the best 
interests of the child to be furthered by the natural father having custody, even though 
he would be living at home with his parents while attending college. Fkferring to Caban, 
the court wrote: "This court does not treat lightly the mother's decision to give Rachel 
up for adoption, but such a decision is not within her option without the concurrence of 
the father. (See Caban v. Mohammed, supra.) A child is born to two parents and both 
have natural rights to said child." Id. at 932,416 N.Y.S.2d at 733. Reliance on Caban had 
the effect of isolating the custody inquiry to the respective qualifications of the two natural 
parents, though the best alternative may have been adoption. 
75. These presumptions have been the underlying reason for the governmental re- 
straint implied in the statutory criteria for termination or "dispensation" of parental 
rights. See note 6 supra. The state presumes parental fitness, and so will not interfere with 
familial relations by usurping parental rights until one or more of the dispensing criteria 
is proven. See H. CLARK, supra note 65, 8 18.5. 
9871 CASENOTE 1001 
ability to adequately care for the infant. 
Applying a best-interests-of-the-child standard, a court 
could award custody to an unwed father of a newborn. But a court 
should make such a decision only after thoroughly considering the 
newborn's alternatives, including the potential for its welfare 
with adoptive parents. 
C. Statutory Revision Compatible with Caban 
Because the Supreme Court recognizes the practical differ- 
ences between unwed mothers and unwed fathers of newborns, as 
well as the countervailing concerns of legitimacy and adoption 
that attend the mother's decision to surrender her child, a state 
would be justified in imposing in the area of newborn adoption 
the statutory distinctions traditionally applied to unwed parents 
in general. Caban, in company with Quilloin, indicates that 
states that extend a general consent right to unwed fathers go 
further than constitutionally necessary. Even those states that 
allow consent upon acknowledgement of paternity without refer- 
ence to a familial relationship exceed constitutional demands. As 
the dissent notes, state legislatures may discriminate between 
unwed fathers and unwed mothers if they make adequate provi- 
sion for Ca ban- type fathers.76 
1. Providing constitutional protection for Caban-type fathers 
There should be little problem in the identification and loca- 
tion of the unwed father who has a substantial relationship with 
his older children." Indeed, if there is an ongoing relationship of 
the sort contemplated by Caban and Quilloin, the unwed father 
76. Cautioning that the majority opinion should be read narrowly, Justice Stevens 
wrote: 
The procedure to be followed in cases involving infants who are in the custody 
of their mothers-whether solely or jointly with the father-or of agencies with 
authority to consent to adoption, is entirely unaffected by the Court's holding 
or by its reasoning. In fact, as I read the Court's opinion, the statutes now in 
effect may be enforced as usual unless "the adoption of older children is sought," 
ante, a t  392, and "the father has established a substantial relationship with the 
child and [is willing to admit] his paternity." Ante, a t  393. State legislatures 
will no doubt promptly revise their adoption laws to comply with the rule of this 
case, but as long as state courts are prepared to construe their existing statutes 
to contain a requirement of paternal consent "in cases such as this," ibid., I see 
no reason why they may not continue to enter valid adoption decrees in the 
countless routine cases that will arise before the statutes can be amended. 
441 US. at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and brackets in original). 
77. Id. a t  393. 
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may be expected to pursue the protection of his interests on his 
With older children there is greater likelihood of father- 
child interaction. But this likelihood alone does not justify due 
process protection. In cases where the father of an older child is 
identified and located, the state must require notice and a hear- 
ing, as the very fact he is known and locatable adds to the likeli- 
hood of a substantive relationship. Conversely, the fact that the 
unwed father of an older child is unidentifiable or unlocatable 
militates against the existence of such a re la t i~nship.~~ In this 
latter situation, a state should require only reasonable efforts to 
notify the father concerning the prospective adoption. In most 
cases "reasonable effort" will only require notice by publ ica t i~n .~~ 
However, notice by publication should be resorted to only if the 
circumstances surrounding the mother's consent indicate she is 
withholding information necessary to notify the father. This reti- 
cence towards notice by publication is justified because publica- 
tion could result in an unwarranted invasion of the mother's pri- 
v a c ~ . ~ l  
2. Constitutional protection for unwed fathers of newborns 
Even if the unwed father of a newborn is not allowed a con- 
sent privilege, he may have a protectable interest in the custody 
of his offspring. If read broadly, Stanley requires that notice and 
a hearing be given the unwed father before even potential cus- 
todial rights are cut off. Read narrowly, Stanley requires proce- 
78. One state statute places primary responsibility on the unwed father to protect his 
rights. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.096(~)(5) (1977). 
79. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, $ §  906, 908 (Supp. 1978) (court may dispense 
with consent of father if mother unable to identify, and has not lived with or married him 
since child's birth); MICH. COMP. LAWS $ 710.37 (Supp. 1979-1980) (termination of pater- 
nal rights if identity or location not known and has not made provision for mother). Cf. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-406 (Supp. 1979) (if identity and location not known, notice required 
only if there exists a "familial bond"). 
80. Illinois requires notice to all fathers, known or unknown. Publication is made in 
all cases where the father is not known. So regardless of whether the mother discloses the 
father's identity, notice is given. To protect the mother's privacy interests, her name is 
not included, making the publication of questionable value. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 5 1509 
(1977) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, $ 9.1-7 (1973)). In other states the mother is required to 
disclose the identity of the father and the degree of his relationship. See GA. CODE ANN. § 
74-404 (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. 8 109.092 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-26 (Supp. 
1978). Some states simply do not require notice to the unknown father. See MICH. COMP. 
LAWS $ 710.37 (Supp. 1979-1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§  259.24, .26 (West Supp. 1979). 
81. Admittedly, if a mother has lived openly with her illegitimate child, she may not 
have much of a privacy interest. But it is conceivable that a mother of older children could 
have a privacy interest if, for example, she has represented the child as legitimate. 
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dural due process only when the unwed father has actually "sired 
and raised" his children." Following the latter argument, an 
unwed father of a newborn would by definition have no constitu- 
tionally protectable interest in his child. 
An approach that would better allow for the competing inter- 
ests involved would be to allow the unwed father of the newborn 
notice and an opportunity to be heard concerning the child's best 
interests if he has demonstrated his interests in the child by some 
form of acknowledgement within a reasonable time after learning 
of pregnancy or after the child's birth? It is difficult to define the 
basis for such a right since "[plarental rights do not spring full- 
blown from the biological connection between parent and child. 
They require relationships more enduring."84 If not derived from 
the biological relationship alone, perhaps the right to notice and 
a hearing upon some formal showing of interest derives from the 
policy suggested by Stanley-that a state's interests in pursuing 
a child's welfare are de minimis when a natural parent is able to 
provide adequate care? Therefore, notice should be given to pro- 
vide an opportunity to demonstrate paternal ability and desire to 
provide for the welfare of a newborn. Because the paternal inter- 
est in the custody of a newborn has not specifically achieved 
constitutional ~ t a t u r e , ~ h n d  given the countervailing concerns, 
notice in these cases should be given with economy-particularly 
with economy of time. 
Not only is rapid disposition a greater concern in the case of 
newborns, but the mother undoubtedly has more substantial pri- 
vacy interests. Rapid disposition is important to protect the 
child's interest in legitimacy and adequate nurture in a family 
environment, for the likelihood of adoption decreases as a child 
grows older." And the fact that the mother seeks immediate post- 
82. 405 U.S. at 651. 
83. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS 4 710.33 (Supp. 1979-1980) (before birth of illegiti- 
mate, father must file under oath notice of intent to claim paternity); MONT. CODE ANN. 
9 40-6-126 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. 4 78-30-4 (1977) (notice of claim of paternity and 
willingness and intent to support filed with bureau of vital statistics). 
84. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. a t  397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
85. 405 U.S. a t  657-58. 
86. In Quilloin, where the unwed father was not found to have parental rights, the 
Supreme Court noted that Quilloin could not complain that he did not receive due pro- 
cess. 434 U.S. at 253. Under the Georgia procedure, Quilloin had received notice and a 
legitimation hearing where he was allowed to present evidence concerning any matter he 
thought relevant, including his fitness as a parent. Therefore, the Court did not reach the 
question whether procedural due process is required in a Quilloin situation. Id. 
87. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. a t  404 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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birth adoption to some extent indicates her desire for privacy. An 
older mother will have lived openly with her child, and so will not 
have privacy interests as fragile as those of the mother of the 
newborn.88 Only if it appears that the mother intentionally con- 
ceals the identity of the father should the court consider notice 
by publication. But in doing so it must weigh the interests of the 
mother and the child against the potential interest of the father. 
If the unwed father of the newborn is unidentified and unlocated 
at the time of the adoption proceeding, he should be presumed 
uninterested, and any rights he might claim to the child should 
be terminated.89 And to guard the interest of the adoptive parents 
in unconditional custody of the child, the same presumption 
should attach to the unwed father's failure, after notice, to ap- 
pear 
As noted by the Stanley Court, granting a hearing to those 
few unwed fathers who come forward voluntarily or in response 
to notice should not cause great burden or delay?' Once the father 
of a newborn is in court, the evidence he presents concerning the 
alternatives he and the adoptive parents offer should be weighed 
according to the child's best interests. This weighing should not 
include only the comparative material advantages of the parties, 
but should consider the possible value of maintaining blood kin- 
ship and the comparative opportunities of the child for legitima- 
tion." Only if the unwed father can clearly demonstrate an ability 
and desire to care for the child should his custody be allowed, and 
adoption foreclosed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Caban v. Mohammed the Supreme Court held a statute 
allowing unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, the right to ob- 
88. See Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption 
to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517, 524-25 (1973). 
89. See note 79 and accompanying text supra. 
90. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 4 74-406(c)-(d) (Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
19, 4 532-C (Supp. 1978-1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, 4 4A (West Supp. 1979); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS 4 710.36 (Supp. 1979-1980). 
91. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9. 
92. After all, it is possible that the child's likelihood for obtaining a stable environ- 
ment could best be served by maintaining the blood relationship with its natural parent. 
Perhaps allowing a fit natural parent to maintain custody of the child would actually 
encourage marriage. A child who remained with his or her blood kin would certainly not 
face the stigma that attaches to adoption. And some commentators have noted that the 
adoptive relationship is fraught with uncertainty, instability, and search for identity. See 
generally A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE (1978). 
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ject to the adoption of their illegitimate children violative of the 
equal protection clause as an over-inclusive gender-based classifi- 
cation. The Court did not, however, extend equal adoption con- 
sent rights to all unwed fathers. Instead, it restricted the applica- 
tion of its holding to adoptions involving older children where the 
unwed father has established a "substantial" familial relation- 
ship with his offspring. The remainder of unwed fathers-fathers 
of newborn infants-are not entitled to automatic rights. Yet they 
may be entitled to a hearing to determine their ability, as com- 
pared to adoptive parents, to provide for the best interests of the 
child. A state legislature, therefore, may constitutionally discrim- 
inate between unwed mothers and unwed fathers as long as ade- 
quate provision is made for the father of older children who enjoys 
a substantial parent-child relationship. 
Stephen Jerry Sturgill 
